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A Common Lawyer's Perspective on the European
Perspective on Punitive Damages
Michael L. Wells*
While punitive damages are well-entrenched in the common
law legal systems of the United States' and Great Britain,2 they
have a far smaller role in the civil law tradition of Continental
Europe. Writing in these pages a year ago, Professor Helmut
Koziol offered "a European Perspective" on punitive damages.3 He
pointed out that punitive damages are generally disfavored in
Continental legal systems, 4 expressed his own disapproval of
them,5 and offered an array of reasons for rejecting or restricting
their use. 6 Professor Koziol's article is typical of punitive damages
scholarship in its focus on normative issues raised by the doctrine
-whether, why, and under what criteria should punitive damages
be awarded. The literature addressing questions of this kind is
extensive and sophisticated, and I have nothing to contribute to it.
7
Rather, this Article takes a comparative perspective, exploring the
civil law-common law divide as it relates to punitive damages.
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1. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1062-66 (2000) (discussing the
role of punitive damages in American tort law). Louisiana is a special case. See
John W. deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Damages-A Conflict of Traditions,
70 LA. L. REV. 579 (2010). Most of American tort law is state law, but there are
exceptions. Maritime law, for example, is federal common law. For analysis of
the role of punitive damages in that area, see David W. Robertson, Punitive
Damages in U.S. Maritime Law, 70 LA. L. REv. 463 (2010).
2. See B.S. MARKESINIS & S.F. DEAKN, TORT LAW 726-30 (4th ed. 1999)
(discussing English law).
3. Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages-A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REv. 741 (2008).
4. Id. at 748 & n.44.
5. Id. at 743. See also YVONNE LAMBERT-FAIVRE, LE DROrT DU DOMMAGE
CORPOREL 527-28 (5th ed. 2004) (strongly opposing the American view).
6. Koziol, supra note 3, at 751-58.
7. Recent contributions to that literature include, among others, Thomas B.
Colby, Clearing the Smoke From Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, Present,
and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392 (2008) [hereinafter Colby,
Clearing the Smoke]; Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive
Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009); Anthony
J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REv. 957
(2007); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113
YALE L.J. 347 (2003); Benjamin v. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84
TEX. L. REV. 105 (2005).
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My premise, a familiar one to comparative scholars, is that we
may better understand, appreciate, evaluate, and criticize our own
system by standing outside it, studying another, and then looking at
our own practices with fresh eyes.8 Some differences among the
black letter rules of one legal system and those of another represent
different responses to straightforward value choices, such as
whether the plaintiffs negligence should preclude recovery or
merely diminish it.9 Others may illustrate a variety of means aimed
at achieving a common goal. To some extent, the variety of
definitions of "design defect" may fall into this category.'
0
Comparisons between the ways different legal systems deal with
substantive policy choices in making legal norms can be useful
because they can show that our own approach is not inevitable and
invite us to question it rather than take it for granted.1' One may
find in another system an attractive solution to a vexing problem or
an especially convincing line of argument for one rule over
another. 12 Thus, some of the policy arguments advanced in favor of
punitive damages have influenced the development of European
Community law 13 and even have some influence on German law.
14
8. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE
IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 418 (1987) ("The comparativist will argue, and we
think rightly, that an observer cannot understand his own legal system
sufficiently until he understands what his system is not. Without comparing it to
a relevantly different system, he simply cannot adequately grasp what his own
system is not.").
9. Most common law and civil law jurisdictions have adopted the
comparative fault principle, but a few American states hold out for the absolute
defense. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 504 (noting that, as of the 1980s, Alabama,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia persisted in treating contributory
negligence as an absolute defense).
10. For a comparative treatment, see Mathias Reimann, Liability for
Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of
a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751 (2003).
11. See, e.g., BERNHARD GROSSFELD, THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 11 (1990) (noting that, among other things, comparative
law "can certainly help us to elicit the essentials of our own law," "expose any
oversophistication or imprecision in legal doctrine," and "confirm or confute
doctrinal principles and postulates").
12. See K. ZWEIGERT & H. KOTz, 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 15-17 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 2d rev. ed. 1987) (1977) (noting
that "[c]omparative lawyers often propose that their own system should adopt,
with regard to a particular problem, a solution which they have found to obtain
abroad").
13. See Koziol, supra note 3, at 748-49 (noting that "an inclination towards
punitive damages exists in some [EU] directives").
14. See, e.g., Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in American and German
Law-Tendencies Towards Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable
Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 105, 153-60 (2003).
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Conversely, the civil-criminal distinction that weighs so heavily in
European law has influenced rulings by the United States Supreme
Court that curb the scope of punitive damages while not
eliminating them altogether.15
Other disparities among legal systems are of a different order.
They cannot be fully understood as differences as to which of two
competing values ought to outrank the other. Rather, they reflect
the phenomenon of "path dependence." I use that concept here to
denote the ways in which the paths taken by the two legal cultures
have diverged, resulting in sharp differences in certain basic
features of the respective legal traditions.' 6 For example, "[i]t is
hard to believe ... that the heavy use of the civil jury in the United
States is unrelated to differences between English and Continental
administration that go back to the Middle Ages."'17 In order to
grasp these differences among legal systems, the comparison must
go beyond legal rules to include history and culture as well. As
comparative law scholar, Bernhard Grossfeld points out, "[o]ften
15. Two recent cases drive home this point. In Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352-53 (2007), the Supreme Court prefaced its
discussion of the specific constitutional issues by stressing that due process
requires safeguards against arbitrary imposition of punishment in the award of
punitive damages. Writing for the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003), Justice
Kennedy pointed out that punitive awards "serve the same purposes as criminal
penalties," yet defendants "have not been accorded the protections applicable in
a criminal proceeding." This anomaly, he explained, underlies the Court's
decisions that impose due process restrictions on the award of punitive damages.
See id. at 417-18. For a comprehensive discussion of the federal constitutional
issues, see Thomas Dupree, Punitive Damages and the Constitution, 70 LA. L.
REV. 421 (2010).
16. See Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of
History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 584
(2000) [hereinafter Posner, Past-Dependency]. According to Judge Posner,
"there can be little doubt that path dependence is an important phenomenon in
law." Id. He supports this point by enlisting the comparative. Thus, "[s]ome
evidence of this is that the convergence of legal systems is much slower than the
convergence of technology and economic institutions." Id.
17. Id. For another illustration of how doctrinal differences may be better
explained not by divergent value choices but by cultural assumptions, see
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 208-09 (2009). After examining aggregate
litigation in the two cultures, Issacharoff and Miller conclude that "[alt bottom,
the gulf between the European and American developments in class actions and
other forms of aggregate litigation reflects a deeper divide than doctrines and
formal laws alone would reveal." Id. at 208. Rather, European-American
differences may have more to do with Europe's "top-down" approach to
regulation, in contrast to the "bottom-up" method of the common law. Id. at 209.
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the thing that 'goes without saying', that remains unspoken, never
questioned, has a greater impact than what we call law."'
' 8
In my view, the civil law-common law split on punitive
damages falls into this category of path dependence. Thus, it is
easy enough to understand how it is that Nebraska makes a value
choice against punitive damages' 9 while Georgia accepts them.
20
The two jurisdictions simply weigh the pluses and minuses
differently. 2 The general acceptance of punitive damages in the
common law world and their general rejection in Continental legal
systems is another matter. If the availability of punitive damages
turned solely on deciding how much weight to put on one value or
another, one would hardly expect to see a pattern that more or less
neatly tracks the civil law-common law divide. But then the
question arises: why is it that societies with so much shared history
and so many shared values diverge so sharply on punitive
damages?
The answer, I will argue, lies in a basic cultural difference
between the civil law and the common law traditions. The notion
of awarding punitive damages for private wrongs is somewhat at
odds with the distinction both traditions draw between private and
public law. Nonetheless, there are strong policy arguments for such
damages. The cultural explanation for the civil law-common law
divide is that lawyers, judges, and legislators trained in the civil
law learn that law is a body of rules and are thereby better
equipped to maintain the formal distinction between the two
domains in the face of policy arguments for exceptions. By
contrast, students of the common law study discrete cases and the
facts, reasons, and distinctions courts rely on to resolve them. The
history of the common law is one of endless innovation and
assimilation of new ideas. General principles are always giving
way, and students learn that rule-based arguments routinely lose in
the battle between form and substance. The acceptance of punitive
damages is an illustration of that general theme.
18. GROSSFELD, supra note 11, at 9.
19. See, e.g., Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d
566, 574 (Neb. 1989) (per curiam).
20. For a recent illustration, see Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co. v. Gault,
627 S.E.2d 549, 552-53 (Ga. 2006) (holding that an earlier award of punitive
damages to the state precluded the award to these plaintiffs because they were in
privity with the state).
21. The conflict of laws and forum shopping issues created by variations in
punitive damages doctrine from state to state are discussed in Patrick J.
Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the Conflict of Laws, 70 LA.
L. REV. 529 (2010).
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If I am right that something more than straightforward "pluses
and minuses of punitive damages" value choices are at stake here,
then path dependence may be the key to the divergence between
civil law and common law systems. We must study the history of
how law developed in the two legal traditions, or as William Ewald
puts it, "the effort by jurists, over time, to deepen their
understanding of law and what it requires." 22 Luckily, generations
of accomplished comparativists and legal historians have done the
basic research bearing on the issues I wish to address. I will draw
heavily on their work and borrow their insights for my purposes.
Part I discusses the civil law tradition, Part II turns to the common
law, and Part III argues that certain historical contingencies do
much to explain why common law systems are less resistant than
civil law systems to anomalous doctrines like punitive damages.
I. WHY THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION REJECTS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Professor Koziol's argument against punitive damages begins
with the basic principle that "punishment is outside of the private
law.",23 This is so because "penalties express public disapproval of
certain behaviour." 24 Yet "punitive damages are then awarded to
an individual who has neither suffered damage to that amount nor
has a claim for unjust enrichment., 25 The basic problem with
punitive damages is that "in the area of private law a rule always
concerns the relationship between two or more legal subjects.
Awarding such damages "is against the structural principle that,
under the private law, legal consequences need mutual
justification." Professor Koziol concludes that "[e]ven if there are
very strong arguments for imposing a sanction on the defendant,
these arguments alone cannot justify awarding the plaintiff an
advantage when he has suffered no corresponding damages and
has no unjust enrichment claim against the defendant." 28
22. William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to
Try a Rat?, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1889, 1949 (1995). See also GROSSFELD, supra
note 11, at 8 (asserting that "the only sensible way to treat" comparative law is
as "the comparison of legal cultures").
23. Koziol, supra note 3, at 751.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 751-52.
26. Id. at 752.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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This line of reasoning illustrates three characteristic features of
the "folklore" of the civil law tradition.2 9 The first is "the
importance of clear cut concepts." 30 The general premise-that
"punishment is outside of the private law"3 '-leads quickly to the
conclusion that the plaintiff in a tort case may not obtain non-
compensatory damages. "Judges, according to the folklore, are
merely the operators of a machine designed by scientists and built
by legislators." 32 The "machine" they operate in deciding private
law issues is the civil code, which "marks a new beginning ' 33 and
is conceived of as "the whole law." 34 Once the civil code is
adopted, "[w]hat is wanted is the correct interpretation of the code
provision, not its forerunners."3 5 The result is that, since the
installation of the French Civil Code after the Revolution and the
German Civil Code later in the nineteenth century, civilians have
tended to stress the importance of very general legal norms, which
are located in the relevant code.36
The second characteristic of the civilian tradition is the heavy
reliance on principles of "relationship" (i.e., that "in the area of
private law a rule always concerns the relationship between two or
more legal subjects") and "structure" (i.e., "the structural principle
that, under the private law, legal consequences need mutual
29. The term "folklore" is borrowed from JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE
CiviL LAW TRADITION 80-82, 84 (2d ed. 1985). Professor Merryman's point is
that the reality of civil law adjudication differs from this image. Thus, "[tihe gap
between the model of the legal process that has grown out of the civil law
tradition on the one hand, and what people and institutions actually do on the
other, is widely appreciated within the civil law world." Id. at 83. Nonetheless,
the folklore has a basis in reality. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE
CIVIL LAW 135 (1981) (noting that "to a degree unparalleled in common law
countries or in ancient Rome, users of a civil code are rule conscious and adopt
an abstract approach to legal problems").
30. F. H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIviL LAW 66
(1953).
31. Koziol, supra note 3, at 751.
32. See MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 81.
33. WATSON, supra note 29, at 118.
34. Id. at 119. In principle, the Code is "without gaps" and has "no
conflicting provisions." MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 29.
35. WATSON, supra note 29, at 131.
36. See id. at 135 ("The upshot of all this is that, to a degree unparalleled in
common law countries or in ancient Rome, users of a civil code are rule
conscious and adopt an abstract approach to legal problems."); LAWSON, supra
note 30, at 67 ("The Romans taught the world-including even the world of the
Common Law-the possibility of forming a legal framework for society,
composed of the smallest possible number of elements; and the civilians of later
ages have gone even further in the work of generalization, which, as it
organized, also reduced the number of component parts.").
562 [Vol. 70
201 0]EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES 563
justification.") 37 One of the points of enacting a code was to
rationalize the law by bringing coherence to the mass of pre-code
rules, principles, and customs.38 When creating a unified code,
civilian scholars identified the relationships between these
disparate sources of law and imposed an order upon them that was
previously lacking. 39 Civilians learn that in working their way from
general principles to rulings in particular cases, lawyers and judges
should pay close attention to the structure of the law and the
relationships the code identifies as important.40
The third feature of the "folklore" is that civilians favor formal
reasoning over pragmatic problem solving. Since one reasons from
clear-cut concepts to resolve the case at hand, "[t]he law is made at
least to appear to grow inevitably out of a series of indisputable
axioms.'" Formalism has a downside, in that following a rule
obliges one to forego the opportunity to improve the law. But
Professor Koziol, true to his civilian heritage, is willing to bear the
cost. He finds the anti-punitive damages argument compelling
"[e]ven if there are very strong arguments for imposing a sanction
on the defendant. ' 43 This feature of the civil law has deep
historical roots. One of the points of adopting the French Civil
Code was to limit judicial discretion and see to it that judges
simply applied the law as set forth in the Code rather than
engaging in policy making. 44 Solving problems was a task for the
legislature, aided by the legal scholar. Judges were seen as
functionaries whose job consisted solely of using the substantive
norms and the structural principles in the Code itself to resolve
legal issues. It was not the judges' role to act creatively by finding
ways to make law fairer or more effective at achieving the
37. Koziol, supra note 3, at 752.
38. See MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 27-28; WATSON, supra note 29, at 117.
39. See MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 68-69 (discussing the "overlay of
concepts and principles derived primarily from legal scholarship" that make up
"the general part" of civil law textbooks).
40. For a description of "a more or less typical textbook for a civil law
course," see id. at 69-78.
41. LAWSON, supra note 30, at 68.
42. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 100
(1991) ("[A] system committed to rule-based decision-making attains the
benefits brought by rules only by relinquishing its aspirations for ideal decision-
making.").
43. Koziol, supra note 3, at 752. He goes on to argue that some of the
claimed benefits of punitive damages can be achieved by other means, for
example, the doctrine of unjust enrichment. See id. at 760.
44. See MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 15 (preventing judicial intrusion into
policy making), 28-29 (fear of the "gouvernement des juges").
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legislature's goals. 45 In practice, of course, civilian judges often
depart from the formal model of adjudication.46 Nonetheless, the
formal model retains its hold on the civilian imagination, as
Professor Koziol's anti-punitive damages reasoning illustrates.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE COMMON LAW
Common law jurisdictions differ from civil law jurisdictions
not only in their greater acceptance of punitive damages, but also
in the terms of the debate over them. For lawyers, scholars, and
judges working in the common law tradition, the public law-
private law distinction is a relevant consideration but not a decisive
one. They pay much greater attention to substantive considerations,
arguing over whether and how punitive damages may help to
achieve one or another important goal and whether the benefits
punitive damages may produce should override the general
principle against punishment in the private law. Foes of punitive
damages working in the common law tradition know that they
cannot win just by resorting to Professor Koziol's general
princjles: that "[t]he idea of punishment is outside of the private
law," that "punitive damages are inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of private law, 'A8 and that "awarding
punitive damages under tort law is contrary to the separation of
criminal law and private law." 49 His argument smacks too much of
rule-based decision-making for American tastes. American lawyers
trained in the common law method tend to treat "formalism" as a
pejorative epithet.5 ° Although we, too, respect the private-public
45. One of the points of the Revolution in France was to cabin the judges,
who were thought to have abused their authority to the detriment of needed
social change and to the benefit of the aristocracy. See Michael Wells, French
and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 104-06 (1994)
(discussing measures taken to curb judicial power).
46. For example, the French Civil Code contains just five brief articles on
the topic common lawyers would call tort law. See C. Civ. arts. 1382-1386
(2006). Using these sections as a starting point, but no more than a starting
point, the Cour de Cassation has produced a considerable amount of case law, or
what the French call "jurisprudence." Much of that case law is discussed in
LAMBERT-FA1VRE, supra note 5. See also 2 F.H. LAWSON & B.S. MARKESINiS,
TORTIOUs LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL HARM IN THE COMMON LAW AND THE
CIVIL LAW 177-340 (1982) (collecting French cases on tort).
47. Koziol, supra note 3, at 751.
48. Id. at 753.
49. Id. at 755.
50. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 509-10 (1988)
(noting that "[flew judges or scholars would describe themselves as formalists").
An evaluation of the merits of the American anti-formalist position can be set
aside for purposes of this Article.
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law distinction, no prudent common lawyer would try to put so
much weight upon it, nor would he invoke an abstract proposition
like "the principle of mutual justification of legal consequences ' 5'
as a decisive impediment to punitive damages. Rather, American
lawyers and scholars know that they must identify substantive
policies favoring limits on punitive damages.
52
A. Favoring Policy Arguments over Formal Ones
Working within the common law framework, American
advocates and critics of punitive damages present an array of
policy arguments bearing on the advantages and disadvantages of
permitting juries to award them and on whether and how they
should be curbed in one way or another.53 In Kemezy v. Peters, "4
Judge Richard Posner summarized the pro-punitive damages
policy arguments. These awards make up for gaps in the
compensatory award, help to deter conduct that cannot be stopped
by compensatory awards (especially where the act is concealable),
"make sure that people channel transactions through the market
when the costs of voluntary transactions are low," express "the
community's abhorrence at the defendant's act," relieve the
pressures on the criminal justice system, and "head[] off breaches
51. Koziol, supra note 3, at 752.
52. This focus on policy is characteristic of the American common law.
Contemporary English common law tends to be more rule-oriented than the
American version. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 8, at 1 ("It is our
primary thesis that the American and the English legal systems, for all their
superficial similarities, differ profoundly; the English legal system is highly
'formal' and the American highly 'substantive."'). Atiyah and Summers devote
most of their book documenting that thesis. In this regard, Milsom suggests that
the American approach is more in keeping with the historical development of
the common law. See MILSOM, STUDIES, infra note 66, at 169-70 (discussing
the greater flexibility of American common law).
53. See, e.g., Colby, Clearing the Smoke, supra note 7, at 396 ("seek[ing] to
provide a sophisticated theoretical and constitutional account of punitive
damages as both sensible and permissible punishment for the harm to the
plaintiff, but not as punishment for the harm to others"); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV.
869 (1998) (applying principles of microeconomics to punitive damages issues);
Sharkey, supra note 7, at 352 (proposing "explicit recognition of a new category
of damages--compensatory societal damages-that hitherto has comprised one
significant, albeit insufficiently acknowledged, component of punitive
damages").
54. 79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1996).
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of the peace by giving individuals injured by relativel minor
outrages a judicial remedy in lieu of... violent self-help."
When Professor Koziol, a sophisticated and experienced
scholar, undertook to provide a "European perspective" on
punitive damages, he knew that his American audience would, for
the most part, be in favor of punitive damages and enlisted
American skeptics of punitive damages to bolster his case. These
scholars point out, for example, that the aim of tort law is to make
the victim whole, and punitive damages are often at odds with that
56aim. Juries have no ready means by which to measure the
punitive award.57 In certain kinds of litigation, such as products
liability cases involving design defects, a number of plaintiffs may
seek punitive damages, and a succession of juries may award
amounts that, taken together, seem excessive.5 " To the extent the
goal of awarding punitive damages is to achieve public purposes
rather than to vindicate the interests of the tort plaintiff, the
criminal law or administrative regulations are better mechanisms, 59
and in any event the punitive award should be paid to the state.60
55. Id. at 34-35. See also Ciraolo v. City of N.Y., 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d
Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (arguing that punitive damages would be
appropriate in a case where compensatory damages alone would "result in
systematic underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic underdeterrence").
In Ciraolo, the 65,000 people arrested for misdemeanors had been subjected to
strip searches under an illegal city policy. "Under ordinary circumstances, very
few of these 65,000 victims would have been likely to sue, both because the
compensatory damages they would have received would have been relatively
low and because they were, no doubt, in the main, relatively poor and
unsophisticated." Id. at 247. Another corollary of this rationale for punitive
damages is that vicarious liability is inappropriate. See Michael J. Sturley,
Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 501 (2010). Consider,
too, the possibility that the case for punitive damages is especially strong in
certain substantive contexts. See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Punitive Damages for
Constitutional Torts, 56 LA. L. REV. 841, 864-70 (1996) (arguing that punitive
damages may be needed as a deterrent to constitutional violations since
compensatory damages may fall short in that area).
56. Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages:
Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 856-57, 888-90 (1988)
(arguing that covering the plaintiffs litigation costs should be the main goal of
punitive damages).
57. See id. at 834.
58. See Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem:
Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 583 (2003).
59. See Koziol, supra note 3, at 762 ("[T]he best solution would be to
develop criminal, administrative, and procedural laws in such a manner that the
necessary prevention could be secured.").
60. Some states have at least partially adopted this reasoning by enacting
statutes under which part of the award will go to the state. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 915 (9th ed. 2008).
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Along with the policy debate, the American literature includes
empirical studies that provide information helpful to one side or
the other.
61
This array of arguments for and against punitive damages has
produced a complex body of doctrine. The rules vary from state to
state. Most of the law remains judge-made common law, but
statutory modifications are not uncommon, state constitutional
provisions control some matters, and in recent years the Supreme
Court has imposed federal constitutional restrictions on punitive
damages. But the Court has declined to impose categorical limits
on the doctrine, such as setting fixed ratios between compensatory
and punitive damages. No court or any legislature has ever
succeeded in imposing any kind of order on punitive damages
doctrine. In any given case, the reasoning is much more likely to
be policy-oriented than conceptual. Judge Posner's opinion in
Kemezy is typical. The specific issue in the case was whether the
plaintiff is obliged to present "evidence concerning the defendant's
net worth for purposes of equipping the jury with information
essential to a just measurement of punitive damages." 63 After
recounting the various aims of punitive damages, Judge Posner
asked whether those aims justify placing such a burden on the
plaintiff and decided that they do not.
64
B. How the Common Law Developed over Time
Lawyers schooled in the common law tradition take its policy-
oriented reasoning for granted. But the sharp contrast with the civil
law approach-which emphasizes structure, relationship, and
general principles-should prompt us to ask why the common law
remains so unorganized and policy-oriented. This issue is
altogether separate from the merits of punitive damages: whether
one agrees with the civil law's strong presumption against punitive
damages or not, it is clear that on this, as on other issues, civil law
systems can achieve more orderly and structured doctrines than
common law systems. One need not be a civilian in order to
61. Some of these studies are discussed in MARc A. FRANKLIN ETAL., TORT
LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS 746 (8th ed. 2006).
62. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 354 (2007)
(holding that punitive damages may not be awarded to punish defendant for
harm to non-parties); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
422 (2003) (holding, among other things, that punitive damages may not be
awarded "to punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the [plaintiffs']
harm").
63. Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33 (7th Cir. 1996).
64. Id. at 36-37.
LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
appreciate the essential features of Professor Koziol's argument.
Like him, American critics of punitive damages invoke the private
law-criminal law distinction. 6Top-down arguments from general
principles may be comparatively less important in the common
law, but they are still powerful, and the deductive chain from the
civil-criminal distinction to "no punitive damages" is short and
straightforward.
In order to understand the persistence of punitive damages in
the common law, it is helpful first to identify the distinctive
features of common law development over time. The general point
here is that the growth of the common law is hardly logical and
coherent. It is in fact more often quite the opposite. In his essay
Reason in the Development of the Common Law, S. F. C. Milsom
points out that in the early common law "judges d[id] not.., make
avowed changes in the law in response to arguments about social
needs. 66 Elsewhere, in a passage that bears directly on my topic,
Milsom describes "the mechanisms of change" in the formative era
of the common law:
All the lawyer can do for one hit by a rule is to look for a
way round it, make a distinction, bring some new idea to
bear. If he succeeds, the rule is formally unimpaired. If the
route that the special facts of his client's case enabled him
to take can be used by others, the result may be reversed,
but the rule remains. Even when it is abolished or forgotten,
its shape will be seen in the twisting route by which it was
circumvented. And the ideas he has imported will prove
their own strength. The first resort to them may have been
artificial; but their natural properties will assert themselves,
and consequences may follow as far-reaching as the
ecological disturbances produced by alien animals or
plants.
67
65. See, e.g., Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming
Punitve Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REv. 269, 351 (1983) (arguing that
"discretionary punitive damages do not reasonably promote a legitimate
nonpunitive interest. Criminal procedural protections, therefore, should be
required in any discretionary punitive damages action").
66. S. F. C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 150(1985) [hereinafter MILsOM, STUDIES]. Milsom is speaking here of the early
history of the common law. By contrast, modem judicial opinions do explicitly
advance policy arguments in favor of holdings that change the law. See, e.g., Li
v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1232 (Cal. 1975) (asserting that fairness
considerations justify the abandonment of contributory negligence as an
absolute defense in favor of comparative negligence).
67. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS, infra note 96, at 6.
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It may be true, as Ronald Dworkin argues, that over time much
of the law "works itself pure," becoming "more coherent."68 But
Dworkin concedes that it is "never worked finally pure.,
69
Beginning on the "one case at a time" path, the common law
has simply continued along that path. It still develops case by case
with little systematic attention to its overall coherence, resulting in
a large and disorganized body of decisional law.70 From their
origins in the medieval English law, tort law and criminal law have
addressed some of the same social problems.71 No one should be
surprised that particular tort law doctrines, such as punitive
damages, do not necessarily line up squarely with general
propositions, such as the principle that punishment is not the aim
of private law.
68. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 400 (1986). In this regard, Professor
Milsom argues that "in the eighteenth [century] it was possible, for the first time
since the romanesque attempt of Bracton five hundred years before, for
Blackstone to give a coherent account of English law in more or less substantive
terms." S.F.C. MELSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 21 (2003).
69. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 400.
70. In this regard, consider the efforts of the American Law Institute,
beginning almost a century ago, to impose order on the ever-growing number of
common law cases by "restating" various doctrinal areas. See Report of the
Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 4-5, 15 (1923) (a primary aim of the Restatement is
to distill black letter rules from the cases). Thus, a committee of distinguished
judges, academics, and practitioners set to work and produced a Restatement of
Torts in the 1920s. See William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law
Institute and the First Restatement of the Law: "How We Did It", in
RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS 1, 3 (1945) (stating that the ALI's aims included
"clarification and simplification of the law"). But the common law continued to
grow, rendering the Restatement obsolete within a few decades. So another
distinguished committee undertook a second Restatement of Torts in the 1960s.
Again, the cases outran the Restatement, necessitating yet a third Restatement of
Torts, the drafting of which is still underway. See John P. Frank, The American
Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 615, 617 (1998) (noting that a
primary aim of the Restatements was to reduce uncertainty in the law).
Of course, those who participate in the ALI Restatement projects are
common lawyers by training, too, so their efforts extend beyond merely
distilling principles from the cases. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The
Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 595, 604 (1995)
(the ALl and similar institutions "do venture into areas where values conflict
and traditional legal expertise is insufficient to generate effective solutions to the
problems at hand").
71. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 59, 59 (1996). Professor Seipp points out
that "[b]oth crime and tort fit into the larger category of breaches of the king's
peace" and that "[t]he distinction between crime and tort was not a difference
between two kinds of wrongful acts."
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C. Historical Origins of Punitive Damages
With Milsom's framework in mind, consider the origins and
history of punitive damages. The modem version of the doctrine
first appeared in English law in the eighteenth century.72 At that
time, courts exercised little control over jury verdicts. 73 But
pressure mounted for some judicial review of verdicts in cases
where juries awarded damages for injuries that could not readily be
measured in money, such as "affronts to the honor of the
victims." 74 We would call these "nonpecuniary" damages. In the
eighteenth century courts began to review these awards. In order to
do so, they had to identify a rationale for them.75 The "inexorable
pressure to find some rational basis for awards . . . in cases in
which no tangible loss had occurred resulted in judicial recognition
that damages awards not only compensate the injured but also
punish wrongdoers and deter wrongdoing."
76
At about the same time, courts recognized the notion of "pain
and suffering" as a means of compensating nonpecuniary
injuries.77 A strong commitment to systemic coherence would
probably have led courts to combine the two doctrines, treating
affronts to honor as a kind of nonpecuniary damage, either as an
element of pain and suffering or as an adjunct to that doctrine.
Indeed, the evolution of nonpecuniary damages over time has been
in just that general direction, expanding the types of emotional
harm that can be recovered under the heading of pain and
72. It is important to note, however, that the notion of extracompensatory
damages did not appear out of thin air. For hundreds of years, statutes had
authorized the award of a multiple of the compensatory damages in certain
circumstances. See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 5 & n. 26 (5th
ed. 2005).
73. See Dorsey E. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1982) (while "[t]he first reported case in
which a court implicitly recognized the power to set aside a jury verdict
occurred in 1622 . . . courts were slow to accept the authority to override jury
discretion").
74. Id. at 15. See also SCHLUETER, supra note 72, at 5-7 (discussing the
early cases).
75. See SCHLUETER, supra note 72, at 7-8 (discussing the "Justification for
Excessive Verdicts" explanation for the rise of punitive damages in eighteenth-
century England).
76. Ellis, supra note 73, at 14. See also SCHLJETER, supra note 72, at 8-10
(discussing these rationales in the early history of punitive damages doctrine).
77. See Jeffrey O'Connell & Rita James Simon, Payment for Pain &
Suffering: Who Wants What, When & Why, 1972 U. ILL. L. F. 1, 91 (1972)
(containing, in relevant part, Appendix V consisting of a paper by Jeffrey
O'Connell & Theodore M. Bailey, "The History of Payment for Pain &
Suffering").
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suffering.7 8 But the case-by-case decision-making of the common
law tends to result in a kind of compartmentalization. Dworkin
points out that "U]udicial opinions normally begin by assigning the
case in hand to some department of law, and the precedents and
statutes considered are usually drawn exclusively from that
department." 79 Pain and suffering followed one track, while
punitive damages took another.
Here, as elsewhere, the common law method is one that
"produces great logical strength in detail and great overall
disorder."80 While this method can result in inconsistencies
between two areas of doctrine, respect for precedent generally
assures that logic will be respected in the internal development of a
doctrine. Once punitive damages were introduced, the logic of
reasoning from precedent kept them alive. Having devised punitive
damages as a means of rationalizing large verdicts, common law
courts stuck with the doctrine and elaborated on its content. This
period in the history of tort law recalls Milsom's point about the
role of reason in the common law generally: "The reasoning
adopted yesterday may not have caused yesterday's result; but it
governs the terms in which today's dispute is put to a court."
81
Thus, courts started by approving large jury verdicts on the
rationale that they were aimed at making the defendant pay for
affronts to the plaintiff's honor.
This rationale was chosen not because courts had made a
considered judgment that tort damages are appropriately used as
punishment, but because it fit the facts of the cases in which courts
felt pressure from defendants to justify the large damages award.
Hence, the courts' use of the concept of punishment in the early
cases did not "cause[] yesterday's result."82 Nonetheless, the theme
of punishment adopted in the early cases "govern[ed] the terms on,, • • 83
which" later issues were adjudicated. Courts took this link
between punitive damages and insulting behavior as the premise
for deciding a host of issues as to the scope of punitive damages.
The result was a full-fledged punitive damages doctrine in private
law. In this way, punitive damages became deeply rooted in the
78. See DOBBS, supra note 1, at 1050 (noting that "[t]he pain for which
recovery is allowed includes virtually any form of conscious suffering, both
emotional and physical").
79. DWORKIN, supra note 68, at 251. This feature of common law
adjudication corresponds roughly to what Dworkin calls "the local priority of
interpretation." Id. at 402.
80. MILsOM, STUDIES, supra note 66, at 166.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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common law, despite their incompatibility with the equally deep-
rooted private law-criminal law distinction.
III. HISTORICAL CONTINGENCY AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT
In my view, the gap between Continental European systems
and common law systems on punitive damages illustrates a general
point about legal development. The answer to the question of why
the common law and the civil law diverge so sharply probably
does not have much to do with different assessments of the pluses
and minuses of allowing these awards.84 Instead, it lies in historical
differences between the civil law and the common law traditions.
8 5
Continental Europe and the Anglo-American world share a
common political, cultural, and religious heritage. Yet their
histories diverge in certain ways that have a bearing on all of
private law, including punitive damages. In England, and later in
America as well, the growth of private law took a different path
from that followed by the nations of Continental Europe. Legal
development on the Continent resulted in code-based legal
systems, while the common law remained dominant in England
and the United States. A system built on a civil code will be more
internally coherent and will resist the intrusion of anomalous
doctrines like punitive damages. A system that remains as
unorganized as the common law, with its case-by-case decision-
making, will be more accommodating. The punitive damages issue
is just one among many differences in legal doctrine and legal
institutions that can be traced to historical contingencies.
Two features of the Continental European context were absent
in England. First, Roman law had much more influence on the
84. Another explanation for the difference is that in Europe the loser pays the
winner's attorneys' fees. By contrast, in the U.S. the contingent fee system
systematically undercompensates the successful plaintiff so that punitive damages
are needed for full compensation. See Koziol, supra note 3, at 761. Professor
Koziol might have included the fact that European social welfare systems are more
generous than those in the U.S., adding to the sense in the U.S. that strictly
compensatory damages may not be sufficient to make the plaintiff whole.
These factors surely play a role in accounting for the difference between
American and European attitudes toward punitive damages. But they cannot
serve as a general rationale for the awards because most plaintiffs do not obtain
them and because their award and the amount awarded depend not on whether
the plaintiff needs them but on the jury's evaluation of the defendant's conduct.
85. See Posner, Past-Dependency, supra note 16, at 584 (discussing the
phenomenon of "path dependence" or, in Judge Posner's punning variation,
"past dependence").
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development of European law than English law.86 In some parts of
Europe, Roman law remained alive even after the collapse of the
Empire as the customary law of the region.8 7 In others, Roman law
was rediscovered in the eleventh and twelfth centuries as
commerce began to revive. 88 It became an important component in
new legal systems in France and Germany. The significance of
Roman law for present purposes is that lawyers in these societies
learned at an early stage to conceive of law as a body0 of rules
handed down from a law giver, not as a dynamic process.
The second distinctive feature of legal development in Europe
was the influence of the Revolution in France. 91 The Revolution
shattered old social arrangements and laid the groundwork for the
Napoleonic Code of 1804.92 This Civil Code in turn became the
model for efforts elsewhere in Europe to reform law and organize
it more coherently into codes. 93 Lawyers already schooled in
Roman law now learned that they were to look for answers in the
Code and reason deductively from the general substantive and
86. English jurists borrowed from Roman law from time to time. See
THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 297-
99 (5th ed. 1956). But they never embraced Roman law, or large "blocks" of it,
as the foundation for the legal system, as Continental Europeans did. See
WATSON, supra note 29, at 14-22.
87. See JOHN DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 263, 265 (1968) (noting
that "[t]he south of France ... was already [by the late Middle Ages] governed
by a vulgarized Roman law inherited from the earlier Middle Ages").
88. See 0. F. ROBINSON, T. D. FERGUS, & W. M. GORDON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 39-42 (1985) (describing "the
eleventh-century recovery"); DAWSON, supra note 87, at 124-26 (describing the
revival of Roman law in Italy).
89. See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 43-44
(1999) (describing the rediscovery of Justinian's Digest).
90. See WATSON, supra note 29, at 32 (describing the consequences for
legal education of treating the Corpus Juris as authoritative).
91. See MERRYMAN, supra note 29, at 14-18 (discussing the disruptive
impact of the Revolution).
92. See Joseph Goy, Civil Code, in A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 437-48 (Francois Furet & Mona Ozouf eds., Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1989). Goy explains that the adoption
of the Civil Code in 1804 was:
[T]he result of a fortunate combination of factors: Bonaparte's
determination to mark the end of the Revolution and the restoration of
civil peace by completing work begun earlier.., and the drafters' wish
... to achieve a compromise between the old legal tradition and the
novelties introduced by the Revolution.
Id. at 442.
93. See WATSON, supra note 29, at 121-25 (describing the influence of the
French Civil Code in other civil law systems).
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structural features of the Code to derive solutions to particular
problems.
94
Neither of these features of Continental legal development had
much influence in England or America. The royal courts began
making the body of law that was to become the common law after
the Norman Conquest, nearly a millennium ago.95 Initially, the
driving force behind their work was the need to defme their
jurisdiction, limiting it to matters of special interest to the king.96
Their orientation was not that of a tribunal that is handed a body of
law and told to apply it. Rather, courts early on conceived of their
role as a creative one, determining just where to draw lines
between matters within their jurisdiction and those outside it and
how to adapt the jurisdictional rules to address new problems.97
Later, as the jurisdiction of the royal courts gradually displaced
that of local courts, the body of law they made became common all
over England.98 This view of law as a dynamic process remained
the model under which lawyers argued and judges decided novel
issues, and it endures to this day.
99
As for the French Revolution, it had little impact on legal
development in England and America. The common law had over
the centuries acquired an excellent reputation in England. 100
Though the Americans rebelled against the English government,
they adopted the common law, with modifications, as the basis for
their legal systems.10 l These features of English and American
94. See supra text accompanying notes 29-45.
95. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 11-15
(2d ed. 1979) (describing the origins of the common law).
96. See S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
33-36 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS]
(describing the "writ system," which limited the jurisdiction of the early king's
courts).
97. See id. at 36 (describing "the mechanism of change within the common
law" as "the product of men thinking").
98. BAKER, supra note 95, at 25 ("[N]o one had decreed that the common
law should prevail; but a stream of expedients had gradually produced a
situation in which the old ways of doing things died a natural death.").
99. Of course, early in the development of the common law, judges viewed
their task as one of fimding the law, while later they came to see themselves as
making law. But that difference seems unimportant for present purposes.
100. See J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL
LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY 38 (1987) ("political and social thinking" in seventeenth-century
England were "largely dominated by" the common law).
101. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 299-300 (1969) (noting that "[alt the Revolution most of the state
constitutions provided for the retention of as much of the English statute and
common law as was applicable to the local circumstance").
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history helped to put legal development on a different path than the
one taken in Continental Europe after the French Revolution. The
idea of abandoning the common law in favor of a civil code never
caught on in either country.
For better or for worse, English and American courts were
stuck with (or blessed with) the common law. A critic would
complain that Britain and America never made a clean break with
the past and never got a fresh start. A champion of the common
law might respond that it has served us well for centuries and will
continue to do so. My aim is not to enter that debate but to point
out that the American doctrine on punitive damages is largely the
result of the historical events that gave us the common law and its
distinctive history.
That history produced a method of reasoning that emphasizes
the case at hand. Common law courts take one case at a time and
resolve each case by applying the most clearly relevant precedents.
They do not always, or even usually, step back and ask whether
one doctrinal thread is compatible with another. They use whatever
argument may be available to get the result they seek in the case at
hand, without necessarily showing much regard for the original
purposes of the materials on which they rely or attempting to
reconcile all of the conflicts among those materials. As a result,
"[t]he life of the common law has been in the abuse of its
elementary ideas.,10 2 Punitive damages doctrine is a manifestation
of the "great overall disorder"'' 0 3 this approach produces. Courts
did not deliberately take up the issue of whether punitive damages
were appropriate, evaluate the advantages and disadvantages, and
conclude that on balance they were advisable despite the civil-
criminal distinction. Rather, following the characteristic common
law method of deciding the case first and then identifying the
principle,10 4 they adopted the notion of punitive damages as a way
to rationalize large awards they were reluctant to overturn.
Proceeding in this piecemeal way, courts never directly faced the
basic conflict between two broad principles: (1) that the aim of
private law is to settle the rights and duties of the parties by
requiring the wrongdoer to make the plaintiff whole; and (2) the
notion that damages may be used to punish the defendant as a way
of supplementing the criminal law.
102. MILsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 96, at 6.
103. MILsOM, STUDIES, supra note 66, at 166.
104. See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv.
883, 892 & n.47 (2006) (according to "the conventional common law wisdom,"
the "perception of at least one actual controversy ... systematically produces
better rules").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Quite apart from the substantive content of law, civilians
reason differently about legal problems than do common lawyers.
Despite a common political, religious, and cultural heritage, they
frame issues differently and favor distinct sets of arguments.
Lawyers from both traditions can benefit from studying how the
other group approaches case-deciding and lawmaking. Sharpening
our understanding of alternative ways of thinking about law
encourages us to examine premises that we have internalized by
immersion in our own legal systems and that we would otherwise
be inclined to accept without giving them much thought.
The punitive damages issue is a straightforward example of
how consciousness of alternatives can alter our assessments of a
rule or practice. Here is a more subtle illustration, and one that
draws on an aspect of common law reasoning touched on above:
many Americans may accept without much thought Holmes' view
that "the merit of the common law" is "that it decides the case first
and determines the principle afterwards."' 0 5 Frederick Schauer,
however, takes issue with this proposition.106 In his view, the
common law method tends to put too much weight on the
particulars of a given case, diverting attention from the question of
what would be the best general rule. Schauer offers a complex
argument in defense of his view, relying mainly on the
psychological distortion created by dwelling on a particular set of
circumstances. 1°7 A careful scholar, Schauer does not attempt to
draw support from the civil law method, though its tendency to
minimize the role of the particular case seems to fit his thesis.
0 8
His caution is understandable, for the existence of an alternative
does not prove that the alternative is better. Nonetheless, his
argument is made more plausible by the very existence and
durability of the civil law approach simply because many of us are
disinclined to endorse an argument for modifying or abandoning a
105. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM.
L. REv. 1 (1870), reprinted in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES
212 (Sheldon M. Novick ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1995). According to Louis
Menand, Holmes' aim in writing The Common Law, a major achievement of his
early career, was to explain this remark. See Louis MENAND, THE
METAPHYSICAL CLUB 338 (2001).
106. See Schauer, supra note 104, at 884 (arguing that "concrete cases [may
be] more often distorting than illuminating").
107. See id. at 893-99 (on the distorting effect of the case at hand).
108. In concluding his article, Schauer says that his aims are "modest," and
do not include a "claim that civil law regimes are better than common law
ones." Id. at 917.
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current practice (in law or in any other aspect of our lives) unless
we have a concrete alternative with which to compare it.
In the day-to-day work of judges and lawyers, comparative law
is surely a useful tool. Learning about other legal systems
contributes insights to the task of choosing among alternative
substantive rules in contract law, tort law, and so on. But that is not
all. With punitive damages serving as an example, I have
attempted to show that the comparative method is indispensable to
understanding the links between doctrine and the legal culture that
produces it. Since "the nature of any . . . relationship [between
legal systems], the reasons for the similarities and the differences,
is discoverable only by a study of the history of the systems or of
the rules,"'10 9 comparisons should pay close attention to the history
of legal development. Whether the topic is punitive damages or
anything else, comparative law must take account of the historical
contingencies that put Anglo-American law and Continental
European legal systems on different paths. Their divergence over
punitive damages shows that sometimes the different paths have
led to quite distinct doctrinal outcomes.
109. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 6 (1974). See also Ewald, supra
note 22, at 1981-87 (describing and criticizing what he calls the "'telephone-
book approach' to comparative law").

